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OPPORTUNISM AND TRADE LAW 
REVISITED: THE PSEUDO-CONSTITUTION 
OF THE WTO 
Sara Dillon* 
Abstract: The constitutionalization of the world trade system has elevated 
it in legal thinking and given it a false aura of permanency and immuta-
bility. The debate among legal academics on this has centered on the 
technical aspects of trade disputes rather than on the critical issue of the 
normative nature and effects of the system on those most affected— 
workers. The opportunistic actors who successfully argued for the crea-
tion and constitutionalization of the system have managed to relegate the 
debate about its continuing benefits to the side. They have benefited 
from legal scholars’ failure to adequately evaluate and analyze the real ef-
fects of the system. Being a trade law dissident is more important now 
than ever before. 
The language of the WTO, like the language of NAFTA, is “constitutional.” 
It sets up supranational governance with powers to override what had previ-
ously been the province of sovereign states. . . . [B]oth NAFTA and the WTO 
perform the traditional role of constitutions. They entrench certain inviolate 
principles or norms that are above the reach of any national legislature to al-
ter; set limits on the behavior of governments; define rights of citizenship; es-
tablish a judicial system to interpret its own texts in the case of conflicts; and 
provide for the enforcement of the court’s decision. 
—Jeff Faux1 
Introduction: The Importance of Being a Trade Law Dissident: 
On the Geography of the Scholar 
 I recall a conversation I had with a trade law academic after a con-
ference on various aspects of contemporary trade regulation. I ex-
pressed my objections to the whole logic and schema of global trade 
regulation, especially the degree to which trade law had been “constitu-
 
* © 2013, Sara Dillon, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. This paper was 
presented at Boston College Law School’s Symposium, Filling Power Vacuums in the New 
Global Legal Order, on October 12, 2012. 
1 Jeff Faux, The Global Class War: How America’s Bipartisan Elite Lost Our 
Future—and What It Will Take to Win It Back 161 (2006). 
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tionalized”2 without affected populations understanding the relation 
between global trade rules and their own economic fortunes.3 My inter-
locutor countered that global job sharing, for instance, was a positive 
thing, and that the movement of jobs to the more optimally efficient 
locales was similarly to be welcomed. I presented him in turn with a 
hypothetical: what if an academic located in another country—take 
South Africa or India, for instance—could do his university job for one-
half or one-third the salary.4 Would he still espouse the benefits of job 
movement? Would the doctrine of comparative advantage, the founda-
tion of our free trade system, cover this situation as well? Would he still 
support the logic of free trade in goods and services, regardless of ac-
tual effects, but rather in the name of some higher concept? 
 His answer was certainly less assured when the topic of conversa-
tion turned on his own economic well-being. My very simple point is 
that it is far easier to support, or at least accept, the application in law 
of a concept when its adverse effects fall on others. When legal academ-
ics fail to grapple with the inconsistencies, perversities, and likely ad-
verse effects of the laws about which they otherwise think and write, 
they also fail to engage in one of their core tasks: the process of legal 
reform. Law does not exist simply to give them something to write 
about; rather, it is the site where the legal academic intervenes on be-
half of those affected by the laws in question. In the area of trade law, 
legal academics have failed in this all-important task.5 
 The geographical location of the scholar is surely relevant to the 
enterprise of analyzing international trade law. The effects of global 
trade rules fall unevenly on different nations and groups within na-
tions. If international trade law and policy adversely affect American 
labor, for instance, can or should U.S. trade scholars simply continue to 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Deborah Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organi-
zation: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading Sys-
tem 19 (2005) (describing constitutionalization as “associated with the emergence of a 
foundational device signaling a new, coherent system of social practices to constrain behav-
ior, whose authority is legitimized by a political community whose views are represented, 
and which, in turn, uses a deliberative process to make law and which has the effect of 
realigning traditional sovereign relations among constituent entities and between itself 
and those sub-parts”). 
3 See generally Anne Peters et al., The Constitutionalisation of International Trade Law, in 
The Prospects of International Trade Regulation: From Fragmentation to Co-
herence 69 (Thomas Cottier & Panagiotis Delimatsis eds., 2011) (discussing World Trade 
Organization (WTO) constitutionalism). 
4 Perhaps this could happen through satellite hookup, or some other means, as tech-
nology evolves. 
5 See infra notes 90–117 and accompanying text. 
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describe trade law and trade disputes as if their work was disconnected 
from the surrounding geographical reality? It could be argued that it is 
possible, even desirable, for the trade law scholar to study these rules 
from a neutral point of view, much like the study of human rights law, 
but that is to abdicate the role of the scholar as a public intellectual, in 
favor of the scholar as an informed technician. 
 I always tell my trade law students that “globalization” is not just an 
idea that an enlightened international populace embraced as a good 
one. It is not just a policy choice, or even just an aspiration, but rather a 
reality created, at least in large measure, through the operation of real 
laws reflecting particular commercial ambitions.6 If one sees interna-
tional and regional trade agreements as transnational constitutional law 
(or at least as international statutes) and trade disputes as providing 
interpretative case law, there is an unmistakable link between global 
trade regulation and the economies within which we all live and work.7 
 It is doubtful that members of the general public have much if any 
idea as to why and how phenomena such as mass “outsourcing” occur 
or what specific rules international and regional trade agreements ac-
tually contain.8 They are, however, aware that every time their govern-
ment enters into a new trade agreement, political leaders promise that 
this will lead to more and better jobs and greater prosperity, and will 
                                                                                                                      
6 See generally Sara Dillon, Opportunism and the WTO: Corporations, Academics and ‘Member 
States,’ in International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline 53 
(Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008) (arguing, in part, that the global trading system is the 
result of the opportunistic actions of multinational corporations). 
7 The economic effects of international trade law on our lives are discussed by a wide 
range of academic works. See, e.g., Dan Danielsen, Economic Approaches to Global Regulation: 
Expanding the International Law and Economics Paradigm, 10 J. Int’l Bus. & L. 23, 49–50 
(2011) (discussing the economic effects of trade rules on labor and standards of living); 
Stephen Kim Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming the Law of Trade Adjustment, 
43 Geo. J. Int’l L. 797, 799, 856–62 (2012) (same); Alvaro Santos, Carving Out Policy 
Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization: The Experience of Brazil & 
Mexico, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 551, 586–87 (2012) (same). 
8 See Beverley Earle et al., A Finger in the Dike? An Examination of the Efficacy of State and Fed-
eral Attempts to Use Law to Stem Outsourcing, 28 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 89, 111–12 (2007) (not-
ing states’ attempts to “heighten public awareness of outsourcing”); Ramkishen S. Rajan & 
Sadhana Srivastava, Global Outsourcing of Services: Issues and Implications, Harv. Asia Pac. Rev., 
Winter 2007, at 39, 39–40 (noting that the rapid increase in global outsourcing derives 
largely from a combination of increased transnational mobility and information communica-
tion technology); James Emilcar, Note, A Proposal to Prevent Offshoring: An Analysis of the Latest 
Anti-Offshoring Proposals, 11 J. Int’l Bus. & L. 205, 211 (2012) (noting Americans’ unrest as 
they learned from news reports about job vulnerability to foreign competition); see also 
Tomer Broude, The Most-Favoured Nation Principle, Equal Protection, and Migration Policy, 24 
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 553, 553–54 (2010) (characterizing the origin of most international migra-
tion as economic). 
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contain environmental and labor protections.9 It is doubtful that the 
public finds this rationale completely credible, but there is understand-
able confusion as to what the appropriate political response should 
be.10 In short, members of the public do not understand how trade law 
works (although they do know that it affects them directly), and so they 
do not have any idea what kind of reform to ask for.11 
 This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the history of the 
academic scholarship surrounding the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and labor.12 Part II establishes a general framework within 
which trade law should be analyzed, incorporating a normative evalua-
tion of trade and the trade deficit.13 Part III explores the three actors 
who behaved opportunistically in the creation and constitutionalization 
of the WTO and the accompanying world trade system: corporations, 
trade law scholars, and nation-states.14 Part IV argues that trade law dis-
sidents are necessary, especially as the negative effects of the trade law 
system are growing stronger and the constitutionalization of the trading 
system is becoming more ingrained.15 
                                                                                                                      
9 See Park, supra note 7, at 803 (presenting the economic theory of competitive advan-
tage as the primary justification for trade liberalization); Zachary A. Goldfarb & Lori 
Montgomery, Obama Gets Win as Congress Passes Free-Trade Agreements, Wash. Post (Oct. 12, 
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obama-gets-win-as-congress-
passes-free-trade-agreements/2011/10/12/gIQAGHeFgL_story.html (extolling the virtues 
of trade agreements between the United States and South Korea, Columbia, and Panama). 
Although trade agreements cause economic dislocation in the form of outsourcing, the 
competitive advantage theory predicts enhanced aggregate wealth and opportunity. Park, 
supra note 7, at 803–04. 
10 Park, supra note 7, at 820–23, 827–39 (categorizing the economic and political win-
ners and losers of new trade agreements). Gains realized from trade agreements are 
spread across many people—in the form of lower prices for goods and services, for exam-
ple—but the costs are felt locally by those individuals most directly affected by the import 
condition. Id. at 820. As a result, this economic disconnect creates a complex political issue 
of distributive justice. See id. at 830–39. See generally Douglas A. Irwin, Free Trade Under 
Fire (2009) (describing the history of popular resistance to ideas of free trade). 
11 See Park, supra note 7, at 817–23; Ezra Rosser, Offsetting and the Consumption of Social Re-
sponsibility, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 27, 30–31 (2011) (analyzing different approaches for offset-
ting the ill-effects of trade law and positing “that consumption offsetting can help individuals 
realize their obligations”). How we determine an appropriate economic ordering will likewise 
determine how we assist the losers of globalization; such an ordering, however, remains un-
determined. See Park, supra note 7, at 826. 
12 See infra notes 16–51 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 52–70 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 71–124 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 125–150 and accompanying text. 
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I. Labor versus Capital: Conventional Trade Lawyer Analysis 
of Labor and the WTO 
 Several years ago, I published an essay that I felt summed up every-
thing I wanted to say about the WTO, both as a creation of interna-
tional law and as an object of regard for legal academics.16 It was the 
essay of a “trade law dissident,” and I had resigned myself to remain in 
the outer darkness in comparison to the “demi-gods” of trade law 
scholarship. I had the sense that most of that mainstream trade scholar-
ship was dangerously off the mark in its narrow focus and technocratic 
orientation.17 Yet, I was convinced that this field would continue to be 
dominated, problematically, by a small number of legal academics pos-
sessed of the detailed technical knowledge to grasp the workings of 
trade, but with little if any “useful” commentary on the interaction of 
empirical economic reality and the structure of international economic 
law, which had been quickly elevated to the “constitutional” level.18 The 
term “useful” here refers to a scholarly contribution to the general pub-
                                                                                                                      
16 See Dillon, supra note 6, at 53 (discussing the opportunistic actions of corporations, 
academics, and nation-states during the creation of the WTO). 
17 See generally Antonia Eliason, Science Versus Law in WTO Jurisprudence: The 
(Mis)Interpretation of the Scientific Process and the (In)Sufficiency of Scientific Evidence in EC-
Biotech, 41 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 341 (2009) (discussing the technicalities of the Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement and its interpretation in WTO disputes); 
Gregory Shaffer, A Structural Theory of WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Institutional Choice Lies at 
the Center of the GMO Case, 41 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1 (2008) (discussing the structure of 
the WTO and its impact on dispute settlement). But see generally Robert Bloink, Is the United 
States Corporate Tax Policy Outsourcing America? A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Tax Holiday for 
Trapped CFC Earnings, 56 Vill. L. Rev. 833 (2012) (discussing the effects of tax policy on 
U.S. stakeholders); Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Rationality: A Sociological Construction of the World 
Trade Organization, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 321 (2012) (critiquing the rational-institutional analy-
sis of the WTO); Barnali Choudhury, The Façade of Neutrality: Uncovering Gender Silences in 
International Trade, 15 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 113 (2008) (discussing the social impact 
of international trade); Park, supra note 7 (discussing the impact of the global trading 
regime on workers and explaining how trade adjustment could be reformed). 
18 Of course, there are various meanings one could ascribe to “empirical.” One school 
of thought has it that international law in general, and international trade law studies in 
particular, have recently taken a “turn” in the direction of empirical analysis. See, e.g., 
Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 
Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 1, 3 (2012). The authors seem, however, to be referring to empirical stud-
ies of the manner in which the system actually works, rather than the link between the 
operation of the law and its effects on real people who bear the brunt of its effects. See id.; 
Jun Zhao & Timothy Webster, Taking Stock: China’s First Decade of Free Trade, 33 U. Pa. J. 
Int’l L. 65, 76 (2011) (referring to the “gravity equation” approach as the “empirical 
workhorse” in international trade law studies). I will use the term in this latter manner. 
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lic’s understanding of the underlying motivations for and workings of 
international trade regulation.19 
 As “international trade law studies” developed, I could not fathom 
why and how so many could focus on the technique of trade disputes 
without acknowledging the dramatic implications for American workers 
embedded within the then-newly elevated global trade rules.20 It could 
be argued that there is no scholarly reason to focus on “American” 
workers than on any other workers—that the entire project is simply a 
matter of denationalized economic theory.21 That consistent failure to 
pursue an empirical approach was instructive. The intellectual basis for 
the trade rules in a “comparative advantage” doctrine was flimsy, the 
likely outcome for certain labor interests plain to see, and yet what was 
glaringly important to me was completely ignored by most “specialists” 
in the field.22 My dominant impression, then as now, was that trade law 
was far too important to be left to trade lawyers. 
 The “trade and labor” problem was not lost on those concerned 
with labor rights and interests at the time of the WTO’s creation, or 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Dillon, supra note 6, at 70–71 (citing Catharine MacKinnon, Women’s Lives, 
Men’s Laws 6 (2005)). 
20 See David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 595, 596–98 (2010) 
(discussing theories of global governance in international institutions); see also Michael Pat-
rick Tkacik, Post-Uruguay Round GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement: Substance, Strengths, Weakness, 
and Causes for Concern, 9 Int’l Legal Persp. 169, 171–72, 179–84 (1997) (describing the 
technique of GATT and WTO dispute settlement). Even where academics analyze the inter-
ests of multi-stakeholders, the discourse often fails to consider the practical realities and im-
port of its own analysis. See Gartner, supra, at 622–29. The absence of such commentary begs 
the question of whether one should be concerned with the economic dislocations in particu-
lar countries. What about the march of labor and progress in working conditions over time—
can one be a scholar or intellectual in a particular country and not take that into account? 
Can we or should we be “post-national”? See also Michael S. Knoll, Perchance to Dream: The 
Global Economy and the American Dream, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1599, 1603–06 (1993) (discussing 
the consequences of a global economy). 
21 See Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1528, 1532, 1550–54 (2008) (arguing that even the anti-globalizers want solutions that 
presuppose a high degree of economic globalization) (reviewing Rawi Abdelal, Capital 
Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (2007); Jadgish Bhagwati, In Defense 
of Globalization (2007); Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medie-
val to Global Assemblages (2006); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work 
(2006)). 
22 See, e.g., Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free 
Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political Economy, 69 UMKC 
L. Rev. 733, 733–34 (2001) (questioning comparative advantage as a valid basis for the 
superstructure of global trade rules); see also Christina Laun, Note, The Central American Free 
Trade Agreement and the Decline of U.S. Manufacturing, 17 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 431, 
431–32, 438–40 (2007) (attempting to link labor effects and the operation of free trade 
agreements (“FTAs”)). 
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later.23 They feared that the newly enforceable trade agreements would 
lead to massive job losses in the United States, and elsewhere in the de-
veloped world.24 Similarly, it was speculated that corporations would ex-
ploit vulnerable workers in countries without labor standards and pro-
tections.25 These two sets of fears (labor cost differentials and abusive 
labor conditions in the production of internationally traded goods), 
although distinct from one another, were certainly related.26 So what 
was the response of trade law specialists to this looming problem? It was 
to focus on Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)27 as the situs of an imaginary battle between trade rules and la-
bor interests, generating literally dozens of academic articles on the topic 
of “trade and labor.”28 There was agonized discussion as to whether the 
                                                                                                                      
23 See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Clarifying the Trade-Labor Link, 37 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 11, 15, 
17 (1998); Steve Charnovitz, Book Review, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The 
OECD Study and Recent Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards, 11 Temp. Int’l & 
Comp. L.J. 131, 154–58, 160–63 (1997); Aleah Borghard, Note, Free Trade, Economic Rights, 
and Displaced Workers: It Works If You Work It, 32 Brook. J. Int’l L. 161, 165–70, 197–99 
(2006). 
24 See Bhala, supra note 23, at 15–19. See generally Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, 
Lost Jobs: Why Fixing the Trade Deficit Matters Most, What Went Wrong ( June 18, 2011), 
http://americawhatwentwrong.org/story/lost-jobs-why-fixing-trade-deficit-matters/ (illus-
trating decades of recognition by U.S. policymakers that trade agreements threatened U.S. 
jobs and their failed, lackluster efforts at combating this phenomenon). 
25 See Bhala, supra note 23, at 15, 19–20; Joshua M. Kagan, Note, Making Free Trade Fair: 
How the WTO Could Incorporate Labor Rights and Why It Should, 43 Geo. J. Int’l L. 195, 196–
98 (2011). 
26 See Bhala, supra note 23, at 17–20. 
27 GATT Article XX provides members with “general exceptions from international 
trade obligations for unilateral trade measures in pursuit of specified purposes.” Sanford 
Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Envi-
ronmental Measures, 22 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 739, 740 (2001); see General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262 [hereinafter 
GATT]. Exceptions include allowing the adoption of measures necessary to “protect public 
morals,” or to “protect human, animal or plant life or health.” GATT, supra, at 262. Never-
theless, Article XX’s introductory paragraph qualifies these exceptions by requiring con-
tinued compliance with certain fundamental trade norms. Gaines, supra, at 741. This 
qualifier is meant to balance the right of members to practice these exceptions with mem-
bers’ entitlement to the rights and obligations of the remaining substantive GATT provi-
sions, and to ensure that neither interest cancels out the other. See id. at 742. 
28 See, e.g., Renee Chartres & Bryan Mercurio, A Call for an Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Labor: Why and How the WTO Should Play a Role in Upholding Core Labor Standards, 
37 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 665, 695–97, 699–704, 708–16 (2012); Justin Fraterman, 
Note, Article 37(2) of the ILO Constitution: Can an ILO Interpretive Tribunal End the Hegemony of 
International Trade Law?, 42 Geo. J. Int’l L. 879, 917–18 (2011); Kagan, supra note 25, at 
208–11; see also Edward E. Potter, The Growing Significance of International Labor Standards on 
the Global Economy, 28 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 243, 248–50 (2005) (discussing the 
International Labor Organization’s role in the “trade and labor” debate and its Declara-
tion on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work). 
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WTO could “accommodate” the labor question, or whether some other, 
as yet unformulated international body should be given the task of syn-
thesizing trade and labor values.29 
 The trade and labor conundrum was both real and serious; the 
manner in which it was approached, however, bore little if any relation 
to the fundamental problems. Article XX could do nothing to preserve 
the job security of American workers because it only allows for a very 
limited exception from international trade obligations.30 Accordingly, 
trade lawyers were conflating two separate matters in a highly mislead-
ing manner. 
 The logic of these academic articles was as follows: a WTO mem-
ber country might at some time enact a trade restriction on products 
from another member country, based on the fact that those products 
were produced by workers who were being treated in some abusive 
manner.31 If that happened, would or should the WTO bodies allow 
that restriction to stand? It should be apparent how divorced this para-
digm is from reality, and from the larger labor concerns engendered by 
the WTO. It is clear that no WTO member country has been or has any 
intention of blocking the importation of products based only on the 
fact that the wages of the workers in the exporting country are too 
low.32 Thus, the central paradox and problem of liberalized trade at the 
global level is not touched by this template and is purely “hypothetical.” 
 The only situation in which the Article XX problem might arise 
would involve genuinely abusive labor conditions.33 In the unlikely 
event that the customs service in the importing country identified and 
blocked such products, the dynamic of high-cost labor versus low-cost 
labor would scarcely come into the picture at all.34 So it should be 
asked how so many law review articles on “trade and labor,” built 
                                                                                                                      
29 Kagan, supra note 25, at 197 & n.3 (citing Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade 
Organization Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 347, 
348 (2004) (“[T]he link between trade, labor, and the environment has been pressed in 
much academic and policy discourse.”)). 
30 See Gaines, supra note 27, at 740–42; supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
31 See generally Chartres & Mercurio, supra note 28 (formulating an argument following 
this structure). 
32 See generally Kevin Kolben, The New Politics of Linkage: India’s Opposition to the Workers’ 
Rights Clause, 13 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 225 (2006) (discussing the WTO workers’ rights 
clause and the link between trade and labor); Thomas, supra note 29, at 347 (analyzing 
whether the WTO should contain labor standards); Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, 
Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 261 (2005) (discussing the trade/ 
labor linkage). 
33 See GATT, supra note 27, at 262. 
34 See id. 
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around an examination of GATT Article XX, came to be written and 
published at all. 
 One threshold issue that must be dealt with has to do with the con-
tinuing relevance of nationality, national interests, and where the trade 
law scholar is intellectually situated. There is something peculiar about 
a trade scholarship that pays no attention to the effects of free trade on 
the writer’s geographical context. Without defining the normative goals 
or values of trade rules, and the corresponding motivations within 
trade law scholarship, writing on global economic law seems a soulless 
enterprise. What should be studied is the effect of the operation of 
trade rules on the distribution of wealth and power within states, as well 
as among them. It is trendy to write about international law and global-
ization in terms of global “networks” and the power of nongovernmen-
tal, private initiatives. However, there are a number of problems with 
this idealized vision. One is that the world trade system itself is mapped 
out in terms of existing nation-states.35 The WTO is a state-to-state sys-
tem, classically part of public international law.36 
 This legal category-based masking gives trade law an appealing 
gravitas that ordinary international commercial law lacks.37 As trade law 
is normally presented, conflicting economic and social interests within 
the nation-state are not accounted for, and trade disputes are presented 
in terms of pursuit of the “national interest” by each participating state, 
much as a military matter might be.38 When U.S. presidential candi-
                                                                                                                      
 
35 See Gartner, supra note 20, at 596–98 (framing the globalization discourse in terms 
of civil society participation). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 
(2004) (presenting a “network” theory of governmental relations and outlining a horizon-
tal and vertical multi-stakeholder approach to global trade interests); Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter, Filling Power Vacuums in a New Global Legal Order, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 919 (2013) (same). 
36 See Dillon, supra note 6, at 55; Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in 
the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535, 538 (2001) (noting the academic 
consensus that the WTO rules are part of public international law); Understanding the WTO: 
Who We Are, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_ 
we_are_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (giving an overview of the WTO’s composition, 
activities, and origins). 
37 See Dillon, supra note 6, at 54–55 (describing the creation of the WTO as a “constitu-
tional” moment). See generally Cass, supra note 2 (describing the “constitutionalization” of 
the WTO and noting its increased weight due to its constitutionality). 
38 See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1573, 1620–22 
(2011) (noting that national lawmakers’ primary concern is to provide particular benefits 
to discrete groups); Note, (In)Efficient Breach of International Trade Law: The State of the “Free 
Pass” After China’s Rare Earths Export Embargo, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 602, 603–04 (2011) (citing 
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 7 (2005) (dis-
cussing nation-states’ choice to comply with international law only when it is in their self-
interest)). Economic and social conditions at the national level drive national lawmakers 
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dates announce that they will vindicate the “national interest” at the 
WTO, they do not mention that what brought the United States to in-
vest so heavily in China, and what led to the movement of so many 
manufacturing jobs, were the self-interested demands of U.S. corpora-
tions.39 Workers have no choice but to think “national,” but this is 
clearly not the case for corporations.40 A logical next step is to consider 
whether trade scholars have any national affiliations, and if they do not, 
whether their writing can rise above the level of bland generalities on 
the virtues of globalization. The economic realm, particularly the in-
ternational trade realm, is one in which we cannot in fact pin down any 
single national interest.41 The drafters of global and regional trade 
agreements, however, have remained mainly silent on the question of 
which forces or sectors within states are the ones most deserving of be-
ing represented in trade instruments.42 
                                                                                                                      
 
to benefit their constituents because national lawmakers are held politically accountable by 
their electorate. Stephan, supra, at 1621. 
39 See Dillon, supra note 6, at 63–65 (describing the self-interested role of corporations 
in the creation of the WTO); Nicholas R. Lardy, Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China, 
Brookings Pol’y Brief, May 2000, at 1, 7–8, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/research/files/papers/2000/5/usstatedepartment%20lardy/pb58.pdf (contending 
that granting permanent normal trade relations to China is in the “national interest”); 
Steve L. Waserstein & Paula Beroza, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Global Markets: An 
Immediate Look at the Legal and Economical Ramifications of the U.S. Subprime and Credit Collapse 
on Europe and Asia, Aspatore Special Rep. 24, at 6–7 (2008) (discussing protectionist 
rhetoric in the 2008 presidential election); Danielle Kurtzleben, China Barbs Reach Fever 
Pitch on Campaign Trail: The Candidates Spar While the U.S. and China Exchange Charges of 
Unfair Trading, U.S. News & World Rep. (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/ 
articles/2012/09/17/china-barbs-reach-fever-pitch-on-campaign-trail (discussing the use 
of political rhetoric about China and the WTO on the campaign trail in the 2012 presiden-
tial election); see also Kara Loridas, Note, United States–China Trade War: Signs of Protectionism 
in a Globalized Economy?, 34 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 403, 410–20 (2011) (discussing 
U.S.–China trade relations at the WTO). 
40 See Waserstein & Beroza, supra note 39, at 6–7; see also Paul Krugman, Robots and Rob-
ber Barons, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/opinion/ 
krugman-robots-and-robber-barrons.html (discussing the tension between labor and capi-
tal). 
41 See Stephan, supra note 38, at 1578–79, 1600, 1621–22 (distinguishing international 
trade law from national law). According to Professor Paul Stephan, nongovernmental ac-
tors are the primary players on the international trade law scene, rather than national 
actors promoting national interests. See id. at 1574–75. 
42 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual 
Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 1187, 
1217–20 (2009) (commenting that drafting the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement as a trade agreement illustrates the disconnect between pro-
tecting national interests and global utility maximization). Intellectual property rights 
provide an illustrative example because these rights touch on the health, safety, culture, 
and politics particular to each nation-state. Id. at 1232. Moreover, as nations become more 
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 As often noted, at the global level capital is mobile, whereas labor 
is not.43 This makes it likely that the interests of capital and labor within 
any given state (especially states in which workers have enjoyed rela-
tively high salaries and benefits) will have opposing interests when it 
comes to the concept of a fully liberalized global economy.44 Gains over 
time by the labor movement happen within nation-states, despite occa-
sional bursts of sentiment in favor of international labor solidarity.45 It 
is the national legal regime that gives form and structure to the de-
mands of labor, generally attained over the course of many labor dis-
putes—including strikes, threats of industrial action, and political con-
cessions from successive governments.46 Thus, for working people, 
there cannot be a “denationalized” global labor system, as they are in-
extricably bound up with the “jobs” picture within their own states.47 
                                                                                                                      
 
developed, their intellectual property needs change, and cultural attitudes shift toward 
exclusive rights. Id. As such, protecting national interests plays a vital role in intellectual 
property that the global perspective cannot adequately address. See id. 
43 Park, supra note 7, at 805. 
44 See Jennifer Gordon, People Are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade, 104 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1109, 1110–11, 1144 (2010) (citing developed nations’ continuing high 
barriers to migration, even as trade laws have liberalized, as indicia of opposing interests); 
Park, supra note 7, at 805–06; Krugman, supra note 40 (discussing the opposing interests of 
labor and corporations). 
45 See Abraham L. Gitlow, Ebb and Flow in America’s Trade Unions: The Present Prospect, 63 
Lab. L.J., Summer 2012, at 123, 124 (discussing the gains won by the labor movement 
through collective bargaining agreements); Gordon, supra note 44, at 1110 (explaining 
that all participating countries mutually benefit from trade and labor migration in classical 
economics). See generally John Godard, The Exceptional Decline of the American Labor Move-
ment, 63 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 82 (2009) (discussing the decline of the American labor 
movement and noting that the decline is an exception among developed countries). 
46 See Gordon, supra note 44, at 1130–33; Park, supra note 7, at 808–11 (explicating the 
influence of domestic forces and incentives on labor markets). Labor markets are also seen 
as domestic legal matters because the labor force is inextricably linked to national culture. 
Cf. Gordon, supra note 44, at 1132 (discussing immigration’s effects on culture, as immi-
grants join new national populations and bring the culture of their home countries to new 
nations). For this reason, political resistance to immigration is rooted in fear of cultural 
change. Id. Also note the role of the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) in global 
standard setting—though genuine protection of labor interests still occurs at the national 
level. See, e.g., Francis Maupain, New Foundation or New Façade? The ILO and the 2008 Declara-
tion on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 823, 826, 832, 840 (2009) 
(describing the ILO’s conception of its mission and role as a standard-setter). 
47 See Godard, supra note 45, at 83 (stating that labor conditions are dependent upon 
the institutional norms and national founding conditions of the labor movement in the 
United States, and noting the U.S. labor movement’s “exceptional” decline when com-
pared to other developed countries); Kevin Kolben, The WTO Distraction, 21 Stan. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 416, 465–67 (2010) (indicating that traditional labor goals and values to pro-
tect domestic workers are deeply ingrained in societies and stand at odds with trade liber-
alization); see also Gordon, supra note 44, at 1144–45 (noting that even in the European 
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 The global trade system, enshrined in the rules of the WTO and 
other free trade agreements (“FTAs”), has undoubtedly demonstrated 
its power to alter the economic fortunes of millions of people, some for 
the better, and some for the worse. In most cases, trade law scholars 
seem to have chosen not to acknowledge the negative effects of free 
trade rules on American labor. Despite these adverse effects, the WTO 
schema was well devised to give the impression of permanency. A par-
ticular national position was seen as being either “in conformity with” 
or “contrary to” international trade law, which thereby came to be seen 
as static and unquestionable.48 It is also noteworthy that trade laws have 
hastened the demise of the nation-state as a relevant unit of considera-
tion.49 If U.S. multinational corporations operate out of and in coop-
eration with China, what is the “nationality” of their business? The only 
site where nationality continues to be enforced is for the human carri-
ers of particular passports, who need to remain in predictable locations 
for the benefit of transnational business.50 In ways scarcely noted in the 
scholarship, our notion of nationality has been profoundly altered by 
the operation of contemporary trade rules, with people locked into the 
old national boundaries, and capital enjoying unprecedented global 
mobility. In the next Part, I suggest a more thorough framework for 
evaluating the world trade system.51 
II. Trade and Trade Deficit: A Better Kind of Linkage 
 My earlier essay took as its main theme the idea of opportunism as 
it has pervaded the trade law context.52 I defined this opportunism as a 
                                                                                                                      
Union, which permits unrestricted freedom of movement for workers of its member states, 
significant wage disparities and resistance to open labor migration remain largely firm). 
48 See generally Robert Howse & Joanna Langille, Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products 
Dispute and Why the WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral 
Values, 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 367 (2012) (arguing that it is extraordinary that scholars have 
consistently treated the WTO as having such authority that nations must essentially beg to 
retain important laws based on meaningful public policy considerations). Setting aside the 
instrumental/non-instrumental distinction made by the authors—which is probably less 
important than they indicate—it is extraordinary that it should be taken in such writing 
that the WTO has, and indeed should have, the power and authority to “allow” public 
policies relating to genuine moral values. Id. 
49 But see Stefan Ohlhoff & Hannes Schloemann, Transcending the Nation-State? Private Par-
ties and the Enforcement of International Trade Law, 5 U.N. Year Book 675, 731 (2001), available 
at http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/ohlhoff_schloemann_5.pdf (arguing 
that the nation-state “is not (yet) being transcended”). 
50 See Gordon, supra note 44, at 1110–16. 
51 See infra notes 52–70 and accompanying text. 
52 See Dillon, supra note 6, at 53. 
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self-serving and self-referential reaction of players to an opportunity 
presented by circumstances, in this case those of the Uruguay Round 
trade negotiations and the creation of the WTO.53 Although I under-
stand that much of the global trade “action” is now in bilateral and re-
gional FTAs rather than the sputtering global organizations, I still think 
of the WTO as having eliminated a great number of alternative political 
choices from the menu otherwise available to national governments.54 
The existence of these global agreements is characterized as eliminat-
ing “protectionism,” with its dark connotations, rather than eliminating 
alternative political approaches to the global economy.55 The Uruguay 
Round agreements did in fact constitutionalize free trade ideas and put 
them well out of reach of political leaders.56 Free trade rules became 
                                                                                                                      
53 See id.; WTO Legal Texts: Uruguay Round, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (noting that the Uruguay 
Round negotiations resulted in approximately sixty agreements and decisions). The nego-
tiations 
took seven and a half years, almost twice the original schedule. By the end, 
123 countries were taking part. It covered almost all trade, from toothbrushes 
to pleasure boats, from banking to telecommunications, from the genes of 
wild rice to AIDS treatments. It was quite simply the largest trade negotiation 
ever, and most probably the largest negotiation of any kind in history. 
Understanding the WTO: Basics: The Uruguay Round, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Under-
standing the Uruguay Round]. 
54 See Gordon, supra note 44, at 1118 (noting the uptick in bilateral FTAs); see also Eli J. 
Kirschner, Note, Fast Track Authority and Its Implication for Labor Protection in Free Trade 
Agreements, 44 Cornell Int’l L.J. 385, 406–07 (2011) (concluding that the “protectionist” 
pro-labor reform agenda was rejected by the WTO). Whereas FTAs often contain pro-labor 
provisions, multilateral trade agreements negotiated at the WTO do not. Kirschner, supra, 
at 396, 407. Although developed nations continue to push the WTO to formally recognize 
a link between trade and labor standards, developing nations resist for fear that such a link 
will diminish their comparative trade advantage. Id. at 406–07. In addition, a host of na-
tional values have been devalued under pressure from the globalized free trade agenda—
not only labor-related matters. 
55 See Loridas, supra note 39, at 412, 419–420, 426 (discussing protectionism). 
56 See Kevin Gallagher & Timothy Wise, The False Promise of Obama’s Trade Deals, Guard-
ian (Sept. 8, 2011, 16:52 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/ 
2011/sep/08/obama-trade-deals (citing President Barack Obama’s criticism that “[w]hile 
[the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)] gave broad rights to investors, it 
paid only lip service to the rights of labor and the importance of environmental protec-
tion”). Despite his campaign promise not to support NAFTA-style agreements in the fu-
ture, President Obama was unable to achieve important reforms to post-NAFTA trade 
agreements. Id. This inability to achieve reform could be due to the constitutionalization 
of the free trade ideas in the Uruguay Round Agreements. See generally Cass, supra note 2 
(discussing the constitutionalization of the WTO). 
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immutable facts to be acknowledged and dealt with, rather than one set 
of options among several available to national governments.57 
 In that earlier essay, I identified three main opportunistic actors in 
the international trade drama: (1) transnational corporations (the sec-
tor having the most to gain from international trade laws, and the driv-
ing force behind them); (2) legal academics (those who write in a spe-
cialized way about trade law); and (3) national governments (which 
participate in the supposedly state-to-state dispute resolution mecha-
nisms at the WTO).58 At this point in time, we are farther along the 
road and are seeing the empirical effects of the judicialization of “free 
trade,” so I would like to expand upon my earlier theory and suggest 
why the debate over the benefits and disbenefits of global trade rules 
has never been more crucial. 
 My overarching argument is that international trade law seems to be 
what it is not, because if presented as it really was, it would not be palat-
able to the general public. If it did not represent some sort of verifiable 
“progress,” then what was the point of it? The entire phenomenon of 
“trade law”59 has been misleadingly described in technocratic terms, 
and characterized as both inevitable and irreversible.60 In this way, the 
adverse consequences have been seen as a mere political sideshow, unre-
lated to the all-important technical knowledge. The specialists with the 
capacity to act as public intellectuals around the issue of trade law and 
its effects are, for the most part, not doing so. Put another way, the 
scholarly work that is meant to illuminate and explicate trade laws in 
fact hides the laws’ true significance. 
                                                                                                                      
57 See Cass, supra note 2, at 16, 19; Gallagher & Wise, supra note 56 (lamenting a na-
tion-state’s inability to push for free trade reform rendered due to non-state opportunism). 
For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations focused largely on investor-state 
investment provisions, allowing multinational institutions to sue a government directly for 
its regulatory actions. See Gallagher & Wise, supra note 56. 
58 See generally Dillon, supra note 6 (identifying opportunistic actors in international 
trade). 
59 See Justin Lahart, Tallying the Toll of U.S.-China Trade, Wall St. J. (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204010604576595002230403020.html# 
(presenting a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study showing the empirical 
realities of international trade law’s implications on American factory workers). Prevailing 
trade theories are ill equipped to handle the surging pace of development in China and 
other developing nations. Id. The world has never seen such large countries grow so 
quickly. Id. As Professor Michael Spence has explained, “It’s not like we can look to the 
past and ask ourselves what happened last time this happened, because there wasn’t a last 
time.” Id. (quoting Professor Spence). 
60 See, e.g., David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 Chi. J. Int’l 
L. 475, 475–78 (2010) (discussing the political primacy of technocratic institutions in in-
ternational law). 
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 A fundamental question largely ignored by legal academics in this 
field is what international trade law was designed to achieve.61 National 
leaders insisted during the 1990s that broad prosperity was the goal: 
new jobs, economic growth, and continued dynamism, progress and 
productivity.62 It is doubtful, however, that these stated values had 
much to do with the political impetus behind the free trade project, as 
seen in global trade laws.63 What’s more, it is impossible to meaning-
fully discuss “international trade law” without facing up to these ani-
mating forces. 
 International trade agreements in the 1990s represented the needs 
and desires of transnational corporations in search of lower cost labor 
and freer regulatory environments.64 By contrast, the approach of trade 
law scholars generally reinforced the myth of intergovernmental coop-
                                                                                                                      
61 E.g., Jess Faux, The Servant Economy: Where America’s Elite Is Sending the 
Middle Class 79 (2012); David M. Driesen, What Is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Be-
hind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41 Va. J. Int’l L. 279, 280–83 (2001) (posing the 
fundamental question: “what precisely must trade be free of in order to be ‘free’ rather 
than inappropriately shackled?”). Professor David Driesen notes that trade scholars use 
vague phrases such as “protectionism,” “trade barriers,” and “trade restrictions,” in an at-
tempt to answer this question, but he contends that this profusion of commentary fails to 
articulate a cohesive normative concept of free trade. See Driesen, supra, at 281–82. As a 
result of this dissonance, scholars fashion and refashion the theoretical bases for interna-
tional trade law to justify its legitimacy and inevitability, while largely ignoring the practical 
effects of trade law on the ground. See id. 282–86; see also Gallagher & Wise, supra note 56 
(discussing President Obama’s promise to promote a “trade agreement for the 21st cen-
tury” but commenting that in fact the trade agreement at issue, the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship, is really just the same, NAFTA-style agreement he campaigned against). 
62 See, e.g., Barlett & Steele, supra note 24 (providing an overview of American interna-
tional trade policies); GATT Head Warns Against Overloading WTO, Sunshine Online (Mar. 
22, 1994, 6:18 AM), http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/process/towards/03220094.htm 
(quoting one of the greatest free trade ambassadors, Director General Peter Sutherland, 
who helped shepherd the GATT system into the new, legally enhanced WTO, as warning 
against the false lure of protectionism, and advocating for the prosperity to be attained by 
embracing free trade principles); see also Meredith Kolsky Lewis, WTO Winners and Losers: 
The Trade and Development Disconnect, 39 Geo. J. Int’l L. 165, 180–81 (2007) (discussing the 
economic justifications for international trade law). The premise for the comparative ad-
vantage theory underlying international trade law is essentially that a “rising tide raises all 
boats.” Lewis, supra, at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, that promise was 
largely realized in the 1990s: from 1990 to 2006, trade volumes grew by six percent each 
year, far exceeding the three percent world growth rate output. Economics: Making 
Sense of the Modern Economy 179 (Simon Cox ed., 2d ed. 2006). 
63 See Dillon, supra note 6, at 54–55. 
64 See id. at 63–65; see also Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. 
Int’l L.J. 303, 304 (2004) (mentioning the impact of environmental policy, labor, and 
human rights on the international trade regime). 
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eration in service of an ideal with broad-ranging benefits.65 Comparative 
advantage was presented in passing as a doctrine of unassailable pedi-
gree; the global economy was presented as having been wrongly “ob-
structed” in its quest for wealth creation.66 The WTO was described as a 
corrective, a virtuous form of international law that, like human rights 
law, would restrain the negative tendencies of national policy.67 Nation-
to-nation trade disputes, it was suggested, would play out to see which 
party could “prevail” within the discipline-imposing jurisprudence of 
one of the WTO bodies.68 
 These underlying premises for the design and operation of the 
WTO and FTAs were taken to be settled, true, and unquestionable in a 
scholarship that focused only on the technical workings of the system in 
the form of disputes.69 I would argue that the value of the disputes was 
more functional than essential, in that each played a part in defining 
the outer borders of the “trade law” empire, by dealing with issues that 
had long simmered at the margins of familiar trade concepts, rules, and 
obligations. A false emphasis on particular disputes explains why trade 
scholars have spent so much time writing about hypothetical trade con-
flicts, with advocacy for one discrete outcome or another, in the most 
narrowly defined policy terms. A better approach, and one that I ex-
plain more fully in the following Part, is to address the opportunistic 
actions of corporations, trade scholars, and nation-states, and to chal-
lenge the theoretical underpinnings of the entire global trade system.70 
                                                                                                                      
65 See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World Trade Constitu-
tion, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511, 521–25 (2000) (describing the logic of free trade as benefit-
ting all countries in the long run). 
66 See id. (explicating the comparative advantage theory). 
67 See Pascal Lamy, Dir. Gen., World Trade Org., Speech to the Lowy Institute in Sydney, 
Australia: Protectionism Cannot Be ‘Smart’ (Mar. 2, 2009), transcript available at http://www. 
wto.org/English/news_e/sppl_e/sppl117_e.htm. 
68 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 64, at 307 (calling for enhanced global governance by 
intergovernmental cooperation and the inclusion of non-trade related topics in the WTO’s 
dispute settlement procedures); see also Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of 
Development: Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 221, 226–29 (2006) (calling for member state cooperation to achieve the 
WTO’s aspirational goal of broad economic development ideals). Like many academics, 
Tomer Broude frames his two-pronged analysis of the WTO in terms of its functional le-
gitimacy, as derived by the participation of its member states, and its aspirational legiti-
macy, as derived by the progress toward enhancing overall wealth among its member 
states. See Broude, supra, at 226–29. 
69 See supra note 17. 
70 See infra notes 71–150 and accompanying text. 
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III. Revisiting the Work of a Trade Law Dissident:  
The Opportunistic Actors in the Realm of Global Trade Law 
A. The First Set: Corporations 
 The real key to understanding the trade agreement dynamic is in 
considering the wishes of the most powerful transnational corpora-
tions.71 Rather than a regime for the peaceful settlement of “state in-
terests versus state interests,” the WTO (as well as some regional trade 
organizations) should be described in a completely different manner.72 
Some commentators on the American economy have made the case 
that international and regional trade laws, in the form of international 
agreements, are part of a larger scenario in which the interests of the 
very wealthy dominate the development of national policies.73 Nowhere 
is this more apparent than in the United States, where successive gov-
ernments have succumbed to the needs of transnational corporations 
in the realms of trade, taxation, and financial deregulation.74 These 
scholars provide extensive, if somewhat predictable, case studies, such 
as the example of Apple—a prominent and innovative American com-
pany that now makes virtually none of its products in the United 
States.75 American companies want to manufacture their goods in the 
                                                                                                                      
 
71 See Dillon, supra note 6, at 63–65; Joel Slawotsky, Essay, The Global Corporation as In-
ternational Law Actor, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. Dig. 79, 84 (2012), http://www.vjil.org/assets/pdfs/ 
vjilonline2/Slawotsky_Post_Production.pdf (considering transnational corporations as 
quasi-state actors in international law). As Professor Joel Slawotsky has explained: 
The narrow view distinguishing between “sovereigns” and “corporations” must 
yield to the new realities: multiple actors exist spanning the globe that possess 
both public and private actor characteristics in varying degrees. These hybrid 
actors operate across borders and utilize major bases of business operations 
over continents, and exert enormous influence. 
Slawotsky, supra, at 85. 
72 See Slawotsky, supra note 71, at 85 (arguing that state actors are not the sole partici-
pants in international trade law). 
73 See, e.g., Barlett & Steele, supra note 24 (emphasizing corporate influence on inter-
national trade policies in America). 
74 See Calvin Woodward, Fact Check: Clinton, Obama and NAFTA, USA Today (Feb. 26, 
2008, 10:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2008-02-26-3154589503_x.htm 
(quoting President Barack Obama, who criticized U.S. international trade policy by stating 
that, “‘The problem in a lot of our trade agreements is that the administration tends to nego-
tiate on behalf of multinational companies instead of workers and communities’”). Corpo-
rate opportunism is also a political reality for presidential candidates; Governor Mitt Rom-
ney’s tough campaign rhetoric against China places him at odds with transnational corporate 
opportunism. See Kurtzleben, supra note 39. 
75 See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, The Betrayal of the American 
Dream, at xi–xii, xvi, 83–97 (2012); Steve Weinberg, Journalistic Duo Who Author Bestsellers 
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cheapest and easiest locations, with the assurance that trade rules will 
allow them to ship these back to the United States, as well as to other 
markets.76 It has long been clear that the corporate structure creates 
pressure on companies to serve the bottom line in the short term, in a 
manner pleasing to shareholders.77 Often this attention to short-term 
profit is inconsistent with making goods in the United States, or in any 
more developed jurisdiction.78 
 Assuming this to be the case, reality is at odds with the view that our 
FTAs are based on a venerable doctrine of comparative advantage.79 In 
the mythology of the WTO, most nations came to accept the idea that 
their citizens would enjoy greater prosperity if they embraced the some-
times difficult doctrine of trade openness, with a view to long-term effi-
ciency and export opportunities.80 It is normal for there to be public 
discussion at the advent of a new law concerning whether that law is a 
net good for most people.81 
                                                                                                                      
 
Do It Again, USA Today (Aug. 27, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/ 
books/reviews/story/2012–08–26/Betrayal-of-American-Dream-james-steele-donald-barlett/ 
57290904/1 (highlighting the Donald Barlett and James Steele book, The Betrayal of the 
American Dream, which examines outsourcing by Apple). As Apple reaped huge profits, it 
moved much of its operations to China, leaving American workers behind. Weinberg, su-
pra. “If the United States is unable to retain the benefits of a successful company like Apple 
and its potential to provide huge numbers of good jobs in this country for years to come, 
what does that say about our ability to encourage future innovators and provide employ-
ment here at home?” Barlett & Steele, supra, at xi. 
76 See Weinberg, supra note 75 (noting the experience of Apple’s profitability due to its 
outsourcing of operations to China). Not only do transnational corporations influence 
international trade law, but they also participate in the regulatory structure of the system. 
Karsten Nowrot, Transnational Corporations as Steering Subjects in International Economic Law: 
Two Competing Visions of the Future?, 18 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 803, 804–05 (2011). 
77 See Barlett & Steele, supra note 24 (describing the interplay of serving wealthy inves-
tors and the growth of the trade deficit). 
78 See Barlett & Steele, supra note 75, at 85, 87–91 (using Apple’s business model as an 
example of American companies using outsourcing to generate huge profits); Weinberg, 
supra note 75 (same). 
79 See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 65, at 521–25 (explicating the comparative 
advantage theory). According to comparative advantage theory, nations specialize in the 
goods and services they can efficiently produce and then trade for other goods and ser-
vices. Id. at 521. In so doing, nations encourage productivity and innovation by using re-
sources optimally. Id. 
80 See id. at 522–23; Park, supra note 7, at 817–19 (setting forth an efficiency rationale 
justifying international trade law). The efficiency of international trade is measured by the 
Kaldor-Hicks criteria. Park, supra note 7, at 817. According to Kaldor-Hicks, as long as the 
gains from liberalized trade outweigh any aggregate losses, society as a whole benefits. Id. 
at 818. 
81 See Patrick R. Goold, The Evolution of Normative Legal Scholarship: The Case of Copyright 
Discourse, 5 Eur. J. Legal Stud. 23, 24 (2013) (discussing the key role of scholars in nor-
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 At the level of political discourse, the international trade agree-
ments of the 1990s were meant to improve the economic opportunities 
of the vast majority of people, including those in the United States.82 It 
appears, however, that in all categories American workers have lost 
ground since the promulgation of these agreements.83 To put it crudely, 
the history of the labor movement shows that as labor gains power and 
influence, corporate management loses some of its wealth.84 Part of the 
motivation for entering into the WTO and other FTAs was surely to re-
quire labor to give back some of the gains of the last century. This, how-
ever, is not articulated by politicians of any party. Rather, the presenta-
tion of new trade agreements attempts to convince the public that new 
jobs—and new, hitherto unimagined opportunities—will derive directly 
from the agreements.85 The national interest is invoked, as it is in the 
trade disputes.86 It is plainly implausible, however, that the erosion in 
American middle-class prosperity has been a mere coincidence, appear-
ing unexpectedly with the advent of a free trade-dominated world. What 
should be the reaction of trade scholars to the facts of trade deficits, job 
losses, declining wage levels, and other social disbenefits? 
 Although the new and enforceable trade agreements derived 
mainly from the wishes and needs of transnational corporations, they 
were presented as opportunities for greater prosperity, which in many 
                                                                                                                      
matively evaluating laws); Park, supra note 7, at 819–20 (outlining the macroeconomic 
implications of income inequality). 
82 See The President’s News Conference in Jakarta, 2 Pub. Papers 2085, 2085–94 (Nov. 
15, 1994) (discussing the benefits of free trade for American workers and expressing ex-
citement about the GATT and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation); see also Gordon, 
supra note 44, at 1134–35 (discussing the overall economic gains expected from interna-
tional trade). 
83 See Barlett & Steele, supra note 24 (citing the thirty-five year trade deficit promul-
gated by international trade agreements that “decimated” the American workforce). Ac-
cording to Professors Barlett and Steele, the trade deficits since 1976 add up to $10 tril-
lion. Id. 
84 See Bhala, supra note 23, at 17–20; G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, 
Who Rules Am.?, http://whorulesamerica.net/power/wealth.html (last visited Apr. 10, 
2013) (empirically showing the discrepancy in the growth rates of CEOs’ pay and produc-
tion workers’ pay between 1990 and 2005). 
85 See Goldfarb & Montgomery, supra note 9 (extolling the virtues of the trade agree-
ment between the United States and South Korea, Columbia, and Panama). According to 
an assessment by the U.S. International Trade Commission, the South Korea deal has the 
potential to create 280,000 American jobs and to increase exports by $12 billion. Id. 
86 See id. (“These free-trade agreements will give our economy a much-needed shot in 
the arm and create tens of thousands of American jobs. . . . The passage of these agree-
ments today is a significant victory for American workers and businesses, and will help 
create jobs here at home.” (quoting Montana senator Max Baucus’s praise of the agree-
ments with South Korea, Columbia, and Panama)). 
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cases they were not.87 If not outright conspiracy, at the very least, this 
involved political messaging on behalf of a highly organized constitu-
ency—those forces whose aim it was to maximize corporate profits with-
out regard to the nationality of the workforce.88 This confusion allowed 
for a capturing of international and domestic labor policy by the inter-
ests of “capital,” thus rebalancing a hard-fought road to power on the 
part of labor in developed countries, particularly the United States.89 
B. The Next Set: Trade Law Scholars 
 Part of my “opportunism critique” involves the failure of trade law 
scholars to go beyond the technique of parsing trade agreements and 
disputes. A related question is whether and how commentators and ana-
lysts might deal with the “winners and losers” problem.90 At the incep-
tion of the WTO, experts said that enhanced and enforceable trade 
rules would of course create economic winners and losers, and that it 
would be the task of national governments to respond to the situation of 
the losers.91 An interesting dilemma, however, is posed when, hypotheti-
cally, a trade scholar’s country of origin enjoys a relatively high standard 
of living, and that standard of living is under threat from job losses at-
tributable to the operation of trade agreements—which also have a side 
effect of exacerbating the maldistribution of wealth. By contrast, it 
would be odd for a human rights lawyer not to show some empirically 
based, normative predilections. Yet it is clear that trade law is discussed 
                                                                                                                      
87 See id. 
88 See Robert Reich, The Problem Isn’t Outsourcing. It’s That the Prosperity of Big Business Has 
Become Disconnected from the Well-Being of Most Americans, RobertReich.org ( July 18, 2012), 
http://robertreich.org/post/27527895909 (arguing that globalization networks mean there 
are no “American” companies). In the words of one Apple executive, “we don’t have an obli-
gation to solve America’s problems. Our only obligation is making the best product possible.” 
Id. 
89 See id. (using Apple to illustrate corporate transnational profit mongering). Whereas 
Apple employs 43,000 people in the United States, it employs 700,000 workers abroad in 
places like China where wages are low. See id. 
90 See Park, supra note 7, at 803–39 (analyzing trade globalization winners and losers 
and proposing approaches to assist trade losers). 
91 See Guido Bertucci & Adriana Alberti, Globalization and the Role of the State: Challenges 
and Perspectives, in Reinventing Government for the Twenty-First Century 17, 18–20 
(Dennis A. Rondinelli & G. Shabbir Cheema eds., 2003) (discussing the role of the state in 
assisting those negatively affected by globalization); Stephan, supra note 38, at 1574–75 
(describing the role of national interests in the realm of international trade law as de-
funct). According to Professor Paul Stephan, with the emergence of nongovernmental 
players in international trade, the notion that national governments will respond to eco-
nomic dislocations caused by trade liberalization is outdated. See Stephan, supra note 38, at 
1574–75. 
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as if it were an immutable system (hence constitutional), moving for-
ward on its own momentum, meant to be watched and described, but 
not from the point of view of a critical intellectual located within a par-
ticular jurisdiction.92 
 At a minimum, it seems irrational to engage in academic commen-
tary on WTO law and its disputes as if the U.S. trade deficit and job 
losses, both in manufacturing and in higher-end research and devel-
opment and services, were a complete irrelevancy.93 At the geopolitical 
level, states are made and remade because of changes brought about by 
free trade rules; within states, socioeconomic reality is rewritten.94 I 
would argue that this dilemma should more properly be seen as “the 
main story” for trade law scholars than should the jurisprudence of the 
WTO’s Appellate Body. 
 Some might object to this framework and argue that global trade 
regulation is based upon international agreements entered into by sov-
ereign governments, a set of commitments made in the realm of poli-
tics.95 The decision to enter into such agreements—most recently and 
dramatically by the massive holdout economy, Russia—is quintessen-
tially a political act.96 To the extent that trade law scholars have a “task” 
(so the argument goes), that task is not to debate the efficacy or pro-
priety of these agreements in the normative sense (which should be left 
to politicians). Rather, it is to parse, to analyze at the level of what has 
happened and what might happen as disputes wind their way through 
                                                                                                                      
92 Compare Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New 
Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 491 (2002) (ana-
lyzing the WTO Appellate Body’s decision in a particular case, but notably lacking a nor-
mative analysis), with Chantal Thomas, Convergences and Divergences in International Legal 
Norms on Migrant Labor, 32 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 405 (2011) (synthesizing the scholar-
ship of international migration law into a set of norms and principles). 
93 See Barlett & Steele, supra note 24 (discussing the detrimental effect of the trade deficit 
on the American workforce). See generally Park, supra note 7 (acknowledging the negative 
economic impact of international trade law on localities and proposing a reformed notion of 
“trade adjustment assistance” to ameliorate the position of trade law losers). 
94 See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 42, at 1233 (using intellectual property as an 
example of economic development at the national level changing societal needs and cul-
tural attitudes). 
95 E.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (establishing the WTO as a supranational body to regulate trade 
among member states). 
96 See Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Int’l Trade Admin. (Dec. 
19, 2011, 9:42 AM), http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradeagreements/multilateral/wto/ 
tg_ian_003531.asp (reporting on Russia’s eighteen-year effort to join the WTO). As the 
decision to accede to the WTO must be made by applicant states having full autonomy, it is 
inherently a political act. See How to Become a Member of the WTO, World Trade Org., 
http://wto.org/English/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
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the newly created system of WTO adjudication.97 Dedication to the 
“what-if” hypothetical is the hallmark of the legal scholar, after all.98 
This self-imposed limitation on imagination (let’s call it an adjudicatory 
imagination) marks the difference between a legal scholar and a pun-
dit, for instance. It also divides legal scholars from genuinely academic 
scholars, who do not tend to accept such external limitations on their 
intellectual role.99 
 Such issues as the national trade deficit and the propriety of out-
sourcing are generally treated as nonessential concerns outside the 
hardcore focus of trade scholars, who instead make careers out of the 
reasoning of the WTO’s Appellate Body.100 Where “theory” does in-
trude into academic writing on trade law, it tends to be rather strictly 
abstracted from empirical reality: game theory or “choice” theory, for 
instance.101 As the adverse economic effects of international trade law 
manifest themselves with increasing obviousness within the United 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Thomas, supra note 92, at 408–33 (synthesizing international trade law norms 
and analyzing their treatment by the WTO). Professor Chantal Thomas’s survey of interna-
tional trade law and migration law reveals divergent rule systems, and she calls for greater 
coherence in rulemaking pursuant to trade agreements. See id. at 406–08. 
98 International trade law scholarship is in one sense too real-world in its focus and in 
another too abstract. As it fails to question the overall structure, and actual effects, it also 
poses and wrestles with questions that involve hypotheticals grounded, apparently, in the 
real world. Where it is theoretical, this does not generally involve a rigorous critique. See, 
e.g., Gordon, supra note 44, at 1142–45 (revealing asymmetry between the movement of 
workers and the movement of goods and its effects, but not offering a rigorous critique to 
bridge the gap). 
99 See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy 
Relationship, 18 Yale J.L. & Human. 115 (2006) (discussing legal scholarship generally); 
Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A 
Report on the State of the Art), 97 Geo. L.J. 803 (2009) (discussing the state of legal discourse 
and the failure to challenge dominant paradigms). The “adjudicatory limitation” on legal 
scholars exists because they feel compelled to remain tied to the actual profession and 
practice of law. In contrast, genuinely academic scholars are not linked in any clear or 
obvious way to a particular profession, and thus do not have their imaginations limited by 
the fact that there will be adjudication on the topic, and they do not feel compelled to 
make themselves relevant to such cases, or in line with what courts will say or do or value. 
100 But see Mark Anner, The Impact of International Outsourcing on Unionization and Wages: 
Evidence from the Apparel Export Sector in Central America, 64 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 305, 
306–10 (2011) (discussing the decline of unions); Brad A. Brooks-Rubin, Monumental Flaws 
and Dysfunctions: Some Suggestions for Mending the Broken Trade Adjustment Assistance Certifica-
tion Process, 11 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 371, 371–72 (2005) (linking trade laws to out-
sourcing). 
101 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 44, at 1111–16 (seeking trade, immigration, and wealth 
maximization through analysis of economic and labor migration theories). See generally 
Kevin Banks, Trade, Labor and International Governance: An Inquiry into the Potential Effective-
ness of the New International Labor Law, 32 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 45 (2011) (discussing 
game theory); Danielsen, supra note 7 (discussing game and choice theory). 
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States, I would reiterate with even greater force what I said some years 
ago: that analysis of international trade disputes is not on its own an 
intellectually worthy activity, and serves only to validate by implication 
the free trade system that has been presented as a fait accompli to an 
uncomprehending public.102 Even less worthy is a focus on hypotheti-
cal matchups between trade and the environment or trade and labor 
policies, all within the safe confines of the WTO adjudication struc-
ture.103 
 To some extent, my analysis in that earlier essay reflected my larger 
sense of frustration that legal academics often excel at the descriptive 
and utterly fail when it comes to the analytical—they quickly become 
adept at the technique of a new branch of law, but are amazingly dull 
when it comes to using their grasp of legal detail to evaluate whether 
the underlying law is a positive or negative development, seen in the 
light of human need.104 This is also reflective of the identity confusion 
in law schools between professional school and graduate school, and of 
the fact that many legal academics have never been true academics, in 
the sense of intellectuals working on behalf of the public good.105 In 
common with other lawyers, legal academics are trained to think in 
terms of winning or losing, and simply apply that orientation to state-to-
state disputes.106 As in other contexts, legal academics tend to ignore 
the dimension of real law reform. 
 Having written on global trade regulation for a number of years, I 
have seen this field as particularly burdened with layers of obfuscation; 
nothing that has happened in the last few years has changed my mind 
on this point. This is all the more remarkable in light of the burgeon-
ing trade deficit in the United States and the now chronic loss of jobs 
                                                                                                                      
102 See Sara Dillon, A Farewell to “Linkage”: International Trade Law and Global Sustainabil-
ity Indicators, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 87, 87 (2002). 
103 E.g., Mark S. Blodgett & Richard J. Hunter, Jr., The Environment and Trade Agreements: 
Should the WTO Become More Actively Involved?, 33 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 16–19 
(2010) (hypothesizing on an enhanced WTO role in environmental challenges). 
104 See Dillon, supra note 6, at 70–71. But see Broude, supra note 8, at 554–55 (inferring 
that fundamental human rights law of equal protection and nondiscrimination flows from 
treating migration policy as an economic activity). According to Professor Tomer Broude, 
the applicability of human rights law is a positive development in light of real-world immi-
grant realities. Broude, supra note 8, at 555. 
105 See generally Schlag, supra note 99 (discussing the state of legal scholarship and legal 
scholars’ relation to the practice of law). 
106 See Park, supra note 7, at 798–99, 803–08 (identifying globalization winners and los-
ers and applying the model to participating state actors). 
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attributable to the “free movement” of transnational corporations.107 
Certainly from the point of view of labor rights and labor conditions in 
the developed world, the toll taken by international trade law is hard to 
ignore; yet, ignored it continues to be in the discourse of most trade 
law commentators.108 
 It could be objected that there is no clear cause and effect between 
global trade laws and the massive job losses within the American econ-
omy, an argument made by at least one liberal or progressive econo-
mist.109 This strikes me as implausible, since the link is fairly unmistak-
able.110 Yet, there are still some who argue that, with the right training 
and positioning, American workers can get a hold of the higher-end 
jobs of the global economy.111 It may also be argued that ideas of a “na-
tional economy” are passé, and that we should no longer be thinking in 
terms of the national, but rather in terms of the global.112 Yet, it also 
seems clear that for a particular worker in a particular industry, there 
are few ways in which he or she can gain satisfaction—happiness if you 
                                                                                                                      
107 Fritz Hollings, Outsourcing: How America Is Losing the Trade War, Huffington Post 
(Aug. 28, 2008, 3:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sen-ernest-frederick-hollings/ 
outsourcing-how-america-i_b_122170.html (decrying outsourcing as a consequence of trade 
liberalization laws and transnational corporations). 
108 See, e.g., Barlett & Steele, supra note 24 (arguing that the trade deficit has “deci-
mated the American workforce, blocked the creation of millions of jobs, created millions 
more jobs for people in other countries, triggered pay cuts for millions of workers who still 
have jobs in the United States, and generally lowered the standard of living for many”); 
Lewis, supra note 62, at 172 (inferring comparative advantage benefits could be more fully 
realized if poorer countries could move trade more efficiently). But see Drusilla K. Brown, 
Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade Agenda?, J. Econ. Persp., 
Summer 2001, at 89, 89–90 (noting that there is a growing movement to include labor 
standards in the WTO). Part of economic development is the development of labor rights, 
employment security, and a share in the nation’s overall wealth. See Lewis, supra note 62, at 
172. 
109 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Off and Out with Mitt Romney, N.Y. Times ( July 4, 2012), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/off-and-out-with-mitt-romney/ (declar-
ing that there is no meaningful connection between American business ( job losses) and 
macroeconomic policy (trade laws)). 
110 See Barlett & Steele, supra note 24; Lahart, supra note 59. 
111 See Reich, supra note 88 (arguing for a national strategy to enhance America’s abil-
ity to compete for high-end jobs in the global economy by improving infrastructure, edu-
cation, and job training). 
112 See Gartner, supra note 20, at 597–98 (arguing that the traditional nation-state ap-
proach is inadequate to address global trade). Rejecting exclusively inter-governmental 
arrangements, Professor David Gartner contends that international institutions like the 
WTO must engage participation from non-state actors to successfully address complex 
global issues in the twenty-first century. See id. 
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will—from the thought that his or her job has gravitated to some other 
part of the world.113 
 The WTO and its rules have been presented as part of a broader 
international “rule of law” —but in fact there has been no correspond-
ing drive toward global governance that would encompass none-
conomic values as well.114 National workers are essentially bottled up 
within their nation-states, where all the mobility and dynamic opportu-
nity has gone to the transnational corporate sector.115 Unlike an inter-
national law sphere like human rights, for instance, from which all 
might benefit, the laws enshrining free trade are premised on competi-
tion and inevitable losses.116 The issue of where these losses will fall and 
how they should fall cannot simply be dismissed as a matter for “the 
nation state.”117 International trade scholars have failed to use their 
expertise in the service of responding to the plight of the “losers” in the 
global trading system. Calling for competitive “losses” to be left up to 
weakened nation-states is an intellectually indefensible position. 
C. The Final Set: Nation-States Shadow Boxing at the WTO 
 I have already described my idea that the WTO is ingeniously pre-
sented as a nation-to-nation system, quintessentially “inter-national,” 
one in which nations and their leaders pursue the national interest in 
                                                                                                                      
113 See Lahart, supra note 59 (citing a study by MIT economists indicating that Chinese 
imports have damaged the U.S. economy more deeply than expected). According to the MIT 
study, the regions of the United States most exposed to Chinese imports experienced greater 
losses in manufacturing jobs. David H. Autor et al., The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market 
Effects of Import Competition in the United States, Am. Econ. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
*2), available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/6613. More importantly, these regions saw 
an overall employment decline coupled with an increase in workers receiving unemployment 
insurance, food stamps, and disability payments. Id. at *4–*5; Lahart, supra note 59. 
114 See Broude, supra note 68, at 247–52 (presenting the WTO’s global purpose); Pau-
welyn, supra note 36, at 577–78 (describing the WTO as being embedded in and part of 
public international law, but not discussing a movement toward global governance). 
115 See Krugman, supra note 109 (emphasizing the asymmetrical reality of global trade 
liberalization and the power of corporations with respect to outsourcing decisions); 
Meghnad Desai, Talk at Global Dimensions Seminar: Global Trade in Historical Context 
( Jan. 11, 2001), transcript available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/globalDimensions/ 
seminars/trade/desai1.htm (discussing the evolution of labor and capital mobility). Econo-
mist Paul Krugman characterizes domestic outsourcing as a “redistribution from middle-
class Americans to a small minority [elite].” Krugman, supra note 109. 
116 See Broude, supra note 8, at 555–57; Gordon, supra note 44, at 1130–36 (explaining 
the fundamental asymmetry between trade and human rights). See generally Park, supra 
note 7 (discussing the fundamental principle that comparative advantage, the theory on 
which free trade is based, produces winners and losers). 
117 See Gartner, supra note 20, at 597–98 (urging global cooperation between nation-
states and non-state actors). 
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an orderly, structured fashion. The two-pronged justification for this 
approach has always been that increasing volumes of ever freer trade 
inevitably delivers general prosperity (for developed and developing 
countries alike), and peaceful international relations (the WTO as an 
arm of the international rule of law).118 
 Current events reflect a growing skepticism among the general 
public toward these justifications, as well as a confirmation of the false 
“national interest” paradigm within which trade relations are con-
ducted. The 2012 presidential campaign provided a perfect demonstra-
tion of the continued anachronistic use of “national” depictions in what 
might better be seen as a class-based, essentially non-national concep-
tual framework. On the one hand, Governor Mitt Romney accused the 
Obama administration of being “soft” on China, and of allowing China 
to dominate the United States.119 On the other hand, the Obama ad-
ministration made a great deal of the fact that it was using the WTO 
dispute resolution system to bring China into line, to “play by the 
rules.”120 But in fact, it is those “rules,” supported by all mainstream 
political actors in the United States, that led to this precarious state of 
affairs to begin with.121 
 In this scenario, we are distracted from the underlying denational-
izing project (the stripping away of the protective powers of the state) 
by a state-to-state dispute resolution system that gives the appearance of 
nations being able to vindicate their “trade rights” in a major interna-
tional forum.122 As described above, the international agreements that 
represent “global trade regulation” have frozen political development 
                                                                                                                      
118 See generally 10 Things the WTO Can Do, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/res_e/publications_e/wtocan_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (highlighting the 
WTO’s benefits). 
119 Kurtzleben, supra note 39 (discussing Governor Romney’s critique of the Obama 
administration’s stance on China). In a speech on September 17, 2012, Governor Romney 
argued that “President [Barack] Obama has spent 43 months failing to confront China’s 
unfair trade practices.” Id. 
120 Id. (reporting on President Obama’s campaign stop in Ohio). President Obama 
announced to the crowd that his administration was seeking redress with the WTO over 
China’s unfair trade practices. Id. According to President Obama, “[China’s trade] subsi-
dies directly harm working men and women on the assembly line in Ohio and Michigan 
and across the Midwest. It’s not right; it’s against the rules; and we will not let it stand.” Id. 
121 See Barlett & Steele, supra note 24. See generally Dillon, supra note 6 (contending that 
the creation of the WTO was opportunistic). 
122 See Jacqueline D. Krikorian, International Trade Law and Domestic Policy: 
Canada, the United States, and the WTO 93 (2012) (noting the use of political rheto-
ric to assert national trade rights); Phoenix X.F. Cai, Making WTO Remedies Work for Develop-
ing Nations: The Need for Class Actions, 25 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 151, 154 (2011) (discussing 
trade rights). 
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not only between states, but within states.123 Yet, playing to an unsus-
pecting public, those running for office invoke the adjudicatory levers 
set in motion by the WTO and other trade forums, in order to appear 
as economic nationalists.124 It is important to note that whatever hap-
pens within the four corners of the WTO dispute resolution system will 
not affect the process of shifting economic power as a result of the 
WTO, as well as other FTAs, a fact trade lawyers have failed to analyze. 
IV. Constitutionalism and Contestability 
 From the time of the WTO’s creation back in the 1990s, I have 
been struck by the degree to which global free trade rules have been 
endowed with an immutable, incontestable character not justified by 
any proven value to those rules.125 I have been equally struck, and frus-
trated, by the analytical insufficiency of the trade law scholarship that 
grew up around this new body of law. Thematically speaking, a major 
problem is the pseudo-constitutionalism of the WTO, and what I would 
call the mistaken elevation of corporate preferences to the status of legal 
inevitability. Constitutionalization refers to a process by which legal ideas 
are moved from the realm of political contestability to something more 
permanent, generally because of a deep social consensus that these 
ideas are transcendent and self-evidently good.126 Thus, they must be 
protected against political changes and vagaries—thereby leading to the 
constitutional elevation. They should, however, be “correct” enough to 
earn this status. 
 The analytical failures of trade lawyers discussed above allowed for 
the elevation of the WTO and the global trade system to the “constitu-
tional” level. The Uruguay Round agreements and the new dispute set-
tlement system of the WTO raised the profile of free trade concepts and 
the rather trite doctrine of comparative advantage into an international 
imperative set beyond a nation’s own willingness to open certain areas 
                                                                                                                      
123 See supra notes 71–89, 118–122 and accompanying text. See generally Eric Reinhardt, 
Tying Hands Without a Rope: Rational Response to International Institutional Constraints, in Lo-
cating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International 
Institutions (Daniel Drezner ed., 2002) (discussing the ability of international institu-
tions to “tie the hands” of political actors even when enforcement is unlikely). 
124 See Kurtzleben, supra note 39 (discussing the use of trade in the 2012 presidential 
campaign). 
125 See Understanding the Uruguay Round, supra note 53. 
126 See generally Cass, supra note 2 (discussing the question of whether the law of the 
WTO has or has not been “constitutionalized”). 
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of trade with the outside world.127 Instead, we now have a set of rules 
that represent an idealized standard to which all nations should attempt 
to adhere.128 In the realm of individual protections against the state, we 
have “constitutional rights,” and on the international plane, “human 
rights.” In the trade realm, it seems that nations (and, by extension, 
their international commercial actors), now have “trade rights.”129 
Through the acceptance of these trade rights, the same nations find 
their political choices to be constrained, even where the effects on their 
citizens might prove to be plainly negative, and starkly contrary to the 
advertised gains.130 This elevation of free trade concepts I have always 
found troubling, and in some places even illogical, but there has been 
little in the way of a rigorous critique of the underlying structure of 
global trade regulation. During the first Obama term, it might have 
seemed that U.S. policy would shift away from a focus on trade rules and 
back to the needs of national workers, but this of course has not hap-
pened.131 
                                                                                                                      
 
127 See Faux, supra note 61, at 75 (writing that in the process of accepting NAFTA and 
the WTO, as well as the Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China Agreement, “the 
American financial elites got the right to invest in low-cost overseas production, sell the 
products back in the U.S. market, and invest in other nations’ banking, insurance, and 
financial institutions”). Moreover, 
Selling these deals to the American public involved a relentless propaganda 
campaign masquerading as economic science. Free trade is close to a reli-
gious principle for American neo-liberal economists, and with some excep-
tions, they were constantly available to insist on its magical powers to bring 
prosperity in the form of cheap prices and high wages. The dissenters were 
attacked as ignorant about economics and prejudiced against foreigners. 
Id. at 76. 
128 Karolina Milewicz, Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: Toward a Concep-
tual Framework, 16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 413, 431–33 (2009). 
129 See Krikorian, supra note 122, at 93 (discussing trade rights); see also Robert Howse, 
The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Worker’s Rights, 3 J. Small & Emerging 
Bus. L. 131, 132–35 (1999) (contrasting trade rights with workers’ rights). Writing in the 
context of the Shrimp-Turtle case, a 1998 environmental law case before the WTO Appellate 
Body, Professor Jacqueline Krikorian states that “the Appellate Body used a two-step ap-
proach to interpret Article XX [of the GATT], recognizing that it was designed to balance 
the rights of one member to invoke an exception to the GATT 1994 rules against the sub-
stantive trade rights of other members.” Krikorian, supra note 122, at 93. 
130 See generally Reinhardt, supra note 123 (discussing politicians’ inability to act be-
cause their hands are tied by international institutions). 
131 See Alexis Early, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: What Chinese Tires Mean for Obama’s 
Trade Policy, Bus. L. Brief, Spring 2010, at 63, 67. During the 2008 campaign only Senator 
John McCain came out in support of FTAs and NAFTA; then-Senator Obama, however, 
turned to the Democratic labor base and invoked ideas of economic nationalism. Id.; see 
also Christopher Alessi & Robert McMahon, U.S. Trade Policy, Council on Foreign Rel. 
http://www.cfr.org/trade/us-trade-policy/p17859 (last updated Mar. 14, 2012) (“President 
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 Prior to 1995, although free trade ideas had been making inroads 
into the political discretion of nation-states, there was no internationally 
imposed obligation to adhere to trade laws when the political pain was 
too great.132 For the most intractable trade conflicts, long-term negotia-
tion, rather than legalized coercion, was the way to go.133 This to some 
extent allowed national governments to respond to different sorts of 
political inputs—that is, from labor, from national producers, and from 
transnational corporate interests.134 With the promulgation of the Uru-
guay Round agreements, there was a sense of the triumph of virtuous 
“free trade,” as opposed to gloomy and retrograde “protectionism.”135 
In fact, there was a broad claim made that, with the advent of the WTO, 
the rule of law would finally prevail in the trade arena, and that states 
would police each other through the dispute settlement system.136 
 During this period of “legalization” or even “constitutionalization,” 
it was not made apparent to the general public that the ability of any 
particular state to make political choices that ran counter to WTO rules 
would be severely limited.137 Even today, it is unclear what the general 
public understands when news reports indicate that “the world trade 
body rules that.”138 The changes of the 1990s were not presented by 
                                                                                                                      
Obama’s views on free trade have shifted since he was elected in 2008 in the midst of a 
global financial crisis. As a candidate for president, Obama was largely skeptical of the 
Bush administration’s free trade policy. He questioned the wisdom of NAFTA and other 
FTAs, and argued that the agreements did not include adequate safeguards for American 
workers.”). 
132 See Tkacik, supra note 20, at 174–79 (describing the transition from the GATT dis-
pute settlement system to that of the WTO). 
133 See id. at 174–75 (noting one scholar’s opinion that the GATT 1947 dispute settle-
ment was not legalistic enough and required consensus in the GATT General Council for 
any decision to be adopted). 
134 See id. (noting that even the party against whom the decision was made could refuse 
to adopt the report, and therefore the report would not be adopted). 
135 See Understanding the Uruguay Round, supra note 53. 
136 One of the strongest advocates for the international rule of law through global trade 
rules is the WTO’s current director-general, Pascal Lamy. See Larry Elliott, Lamy’s Lament on 
Trade Liberalisation, Guardian ( Jan. 28, 2010, 14.30 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/2010/jan/28/davos-wto (describing the dilemma in which Lamy has recently 
found himself with the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements outside the WTO). 
137 See Faux, supra note 61, at 79. 
138 See World Trade Organization: US Rules About Country of Origin Label on Meat Wrong, 
Neogen Blog ( June 29, 2012), http://www.neogen.com/blog/?p=851 (“The U.S. must 
make changes to a program requiring the labeling of meat with its country of origin, fol-
lowing a ruling handed down from the World Trade Organization (WTO) today.”); see also 
Bryan Mercurio & Rebecca Laforgia, Expanding Democracy: Why Australia Should Negotiate for 
Open and Transparent Dispute Settlement in Its Free Trade Agreements, 6 Melb. J. Int’l L. 485, 
498 (2005) (discussing the United States’ need for transparency for the public to under-
stand the Dispute Settlement Understanding and the WTO). 
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politicians and trade lawyers alike for what they were—the triumph of 
the wishes of transnational corporations—but rather as a breakthrough 
for humanity itself, with self-evidently good free trade ideas as finally 
attaining their rightful status.139 This process of legalization conven-
iently left little if any room for interrogation of the free trade concepts 
upon which the new laws were ostensibly based. Trade was presented as 
an aspect or subset of the international rule of law, and who could ar-
gue with that?140 Other (non-trade) areas on the international rule of 
law map were presented as “difficult” to make truly enforceable.141 Mi-
raculously, the trade rules were presented as ripe for judicialization.142 
 In addition to their role as champions of the “rightness” of free 
trade as an animating idea, the trade lawyers and economists who sup-
ported this new system also seemed to be on the side of dynamism and 
globalization. Globalization as a term of art conflated enlightenment 
and mobility with the free trade agenda, contributing to the sense of 
trade law as an uncontestable historical inevitability. Globalization ap-
pealed to that part of us that “likes to travel” —that is, those who could 
afford to travel after free trade’s readjustment of per capita national 
wealth. Liberalized trade borrowed from what I think of as a false dy-
namism, presented as creating, rather than destroying, opportunity. 
The legal paradigm was centered on “creative destruction” and the 
elimination of dark and nasty nationalism, something humanity no 
longer needed, in the quest for economic growth.143 
                                                                                                                      
139 See generally Dillon, supra note 6 (describing the opportunistic actions of corpora-
tions, scholars, and nation-states in the creation of the WTO). 
140 The new rules were presented as an opportunity for one’s own country to vindicate 
that country’s “rights” —thus making it appear that the agreements would give a positive 
benefit by restraining the negative behavior of other nations. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
The ‘Human Rights Approach’ Advocated by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and by 
the International Labor Organization: Is It Relevant for WTO Law and Policy?, in Reforming 
the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency and Democratic Governance 
357, 357–58 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & James Harrison eds., 2005) (discussing the issue 
of where the WTO fits within the larger international rule of law). 
141 See Margaux J. Hall, Using International Law to Promote Millennium Health Targets: A 
Role for the CEDAW Optional Protocol in Reducing Maternal Mortality, 28 Wis. Int’l L.J. 74, 86–
87, 91 (2010) (lamenting this lack of enforceability and  emphasizing that “weaknesses are 
not unique in the CEDAW Optional Protocol context; rather, they are inherent to all in-
ternational human rights treaties’ Optional Protocols where they exist. Lack of enforce-
ability is a concern that resonates across the landscape of international human rights trea-
ties.”). 
142 See Banks, supra note 101, at 131–32, 134. 
143 See Park, supra note 7, at 798–99 (describing economist Joseph Schumpeter’s notion 
of “creative destruction” as “the process by which economic growth is fostered by commercial 
innovation, as new, more efficient modes of production displace outdated and inefficient 
modes of production”). 
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 With the full establishment of international trade laws, those most 
in the know presented this phenomenon as a pathway to unobstructed 
prosperity for the many.144 It should be noted that many trade scholars 
were more or less agnostic on this point, and turned their attention to 
the technique of the disputes at the expense of either positive or nega-
tive assessments of the system as a whole.145 To me, the logic of the 
Uruguay Round—judicialized, legalized trade regulation reinforced by 
a false narrative of “nation-to-nation” disputes—suggested something 
very different from this rosy scenario. If the past hundred years in the 
developed world has been about the struggle between labor and other 
“public” values, against corporate interests for the attention and re-
sponsiveness of national government, the creation of the WTO could 
be seen as a giant reset of the clock.146 It seems a basic truism that the 
bargaining power of labor has to do with its indispensability to ongoing 
industrial productivity.147 As transnational corporations became in-
creasingly free to roam the world in search of the most advantageous 
labor and environmental conditions (thereby greatly reducing the “in-
dispensability” of labor), that advantage of local labor was simply lost.148 
Job losses and a deepening trade deficit did indeed follow the accep-
tance of more FTAs.149 It seemed apparent that this demotion of labor 
was no random or accidental by-product of the collective desire for 
“globalization,” but rather one of the main driving forces in the global-
ization of trade rules. Transnational corporations were increasingly 
empowered to burst the boundaries of the nation-state, restoring to 
themselves the kind of power over working people they had in the 
                                                                                                                      
144 See Barlett & Steele, supra note 24 (describing Presidents George H.W. Bush and 
Bill Clinton’s descriptions of NAFTA as being good for the United States and for U.S. 
workers). 
145 See Dillon, supra note 102, at 87 (arguing that many “trade and” critiques are tech-
nical in nature and inward-looking). See generally supra note 17. 
146 See Michael Lind, The Cost of Free Trade, Am. Prospect, Dec. 1, 2011, at 54, available 
at http://prospect.org/article/cost-free-trade (arguing that successive American admini-
strations have ignored the interests of American workers in favor of pursuing free trade 
ideals). 
147 See generally Thomas, supra note 29 (discussing international labor law and its link-
age to the international trading regime); Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 32 (discussing 
the trade/labor linkage). 
148 See William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers’ Rights, 72 Ohio St. 
L.J. 1115, 1139–40 (2011) (giving a sense of the historic demise of the American labor 
movement); see also Kenneth Casebeer, O My Sons and Daughters, How Do I Immiserate Thee: 
Let Me Count the Ways, 29 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 1, 1–5 (2011) (same). 
149 See Faux, supra note 61, at 76–81 (arguing that the ruling class in the United States 
was indifferent to the loss of economic security experienced by U.S. workers with the rise 
of FTAs). 
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good old days of late nineteenth-century America.150 A global Gilded 
Age ensued; indeed, we may be only at the very beginning of that proc-
ess, and are still living on credit cards to mask this reality from our-
selves. At such problematic moments, process presentation is everything. 
International trade lawyers and academics have a great deal to do with 
this presentation, insofar as they provide a professional, intellectual 
gloss on the otherwise rather crude and problematic idea of maximum 
free trade. 
Conclusion 
 The WTO and other FTAs have been presented as a set of rules 
that can ensure internationally virtuous national behavior—(falsely) 
analogous to human rights law. Nations are said to require policing be-
cause of their unfortunate tendency to national “protectionism.” In 
that tableau, the WTO is the answer to a frustrated world’s prayer. 
Trade law restrains undesirable impulses, and frees the better self of 
any nation. A more accurate presentation might have been that the 
WTO reflected a wish list for multinational corporations, but given the 
structure of trade law (i.e., commandments for nations to follow in or-
der to be better global citizens), this is difficult for most people to per-
ceive. A significant fact is that these international laws reconfigured the 
balance of power not only among, but more strikingly within, states. 
Most people—including those without specialized access to the arcane 
subject matter—could not be expected to grasp this process fully, and 
with all the virtuous progress about, could hardly be expected to de-
nounce such wondrous international developments as globalization, 
economic liberalization, and unfettered opportunity. Accepting without 
protest the constitutionalization of free trade concepts and correspond-
ing global trade rules, legal scholars turned the intellectual pursuit of 
“international trade law” into a technocratic, and often self-serving, dis-
cipline. It should come as no surprise that there is very little informed 
analysis to guide the public and policymakers as global free trade con-
tinues to affect the distribution of wealth, power, and employment 
across and within national boundaries. 
 
150 See generally William Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1109 (1989) (giving an overview of the role of law in furthering the labor move-
ment’s agenda). 
